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Haber: The Design Defect Test in New Jersey: An Unworkable Standard

THE DESIGN DEFECT TEST IN NEW JERSEY: AN
UNWORKABLE STANDARD
Nowhere in products liability is it more difficult to apply standards for liability than in the area of design defects.' While the test
for manufacturing defects arises from notions of breach of implied
warranty and strict liability in tort,2 the test for design defects poses
a much more burdensome problem. In the former, the defect is readily ascertainable because reference can be made to the manufacturer's own production standards and, if necessary, to those standards customarily observed in the industry.3 In design defect cases,
however, this type of analysis cannot be made because a defective
design implicates not only the specific product that caused the in1. The sheer volume of commentaries in recent years is but one example attesting to
this. See, e.g., Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence to [Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980); Epstein, Products
Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV. 643 (1978); Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); Henderson, Manufacturers Liabilityfor Defective Product Design: A ProposedStatutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REv. 625 (1978); Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging
Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1979); Hoenig, Product Design and Strict Tort Liability:
Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 109 (1976); Keeton, Product Liability and the
Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Keeton, The Meaning
of Defect]; Keeton, Products Liability-DesignHazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUM.
L. REV. 293 (1980); Phillips, The Standardfor DeterminingDefectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 101 (1977); Schwartz, Foreward: UnderstandingProducts Liability,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 435 (1979); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher and Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 347
(1980); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products
Liability-DesignDefect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976); Wade, On
Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability 33 VAND. L. REV. 551 (1980); and Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Wade, On the Nature].
2. For the case law in New Jersey, sea Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 332
A.2d 599 (1975); Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 326 A.2d 673 (1974);
Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960).
For the development of decisions in other jurisdictions, sea W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 97-98 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791 (1976).
3. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 236 (1978).
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jury, but also the entire product line. This necessitates reference to
some external standard. Most courts determine this external standard through a risk-utility balancing test, 5 although a conflict has
arisen as to whether consumer expectations should be used as an independent ground to determine liability. 6 The inability to resolve this
conflict-to determine whether to use one test without the other or
even to use both together-may lead a court to improperly formulate
the design defect test.
This note examines this problem as exemplified by New Jersey
law, culminating in Dawson v. Chrysler Corp.' In Dawson, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the
New Jersey test for design defects to the issue of whether a car manufactured by Chrysler was defectively designed.' It is submitted that
Dawson was incorrectly decided because of the unworkable test formulated by the New Jersey courts. Moreover, the Third Circuit
should not have had to request help from Congress to straighten out
this area of the law." This note also reviews the evolution of products
liability law and examines the extent to which other states, notably
California, have influenced New Jersey law. An appraisal of existing
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974);
Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Yoder Co. v. General Copper & Brass Co., 474
F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Byrns
v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d
413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W. 2d
830 (Iowa 1978); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Micallef v.
Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584
S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774
(1975).
6. While several courts and commentators have adopted the use of consumer expectations as an independent ground to determine liability, see, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150,
406 A.2d 140 (1979); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of
Strict Tort Liabilityfor Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 823 (1976); Twerski, From
Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60
MARQ. L. REV. 297, 312-16 (1976), a number of commentators have opposed the use of consumer expectations as an independent ground to determine liability. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra
note 1,at 611-18; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 471-81; see also Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 104(B) & Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UPLA].
7. 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
8. See id. at 956. The court concluded, with some reservations, that Chrysler was liable.
See id. at 962.
9. See id. at 963.
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New Jersey law, as set forth in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &

Machine Co.10 shows that the design defect test currently used is
confusing, if not outright misleading. An analysis of Dawson in light
of the Suter decision shows the impossibility of rendering a correct
decision when applying the Suter test. Finally, this note proposes an
alternative test in light of the Suter-Dawson experience, explaining
why a legislative solution to the problem should be followed by New
Jersey and other states as they continue to refine present products
liability principles.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY

A.

The Early Years

At the outset, it is crucial to understand the evolution of the
case law in the area of design defect litigation. The current New
Jersey design defect test is based on the three early theories of products liability law-negligence, implied warranty, and strict tort liability-any one or combination of which can be set forth in an action
for recovery of damages."" While much of modern products liability
law is commonly thought to consist of strict liability doctrines12 in
the area of design defect litigation, implied warranty and negligence
theories play a very important role, not only as the underpinnings of
strict liability, 3 but also as independent theories for the design defect test. 4
Any analysis of modern negligence theory as it applies to design
defect litigation and, subsequently, to strict liability, must begin with
the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." In that
case, the plaintiff was injured when one of the wooden wheel spokes
10. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); For a detailed discussion of Suter, see infra text
accompanying notes 93-115.
11. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 2, §§ 96-99.
12. Under a strict liability theory, the defendant manufacturer may be liable despite the
reasonableness of his conduct. Instead, the focus is on the reasonableness of the product. In
manufacturing defect cases, liability will always result when the product causing the injury is
manufactured differently from the "normal" product line. In design defect cases, the reasonableness of the product must be ascertained through a comparison with some external standard.
13. In fact the implied warranty theory in New Jersey is held to be identical to a strict
liability analysis. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 733 (3d Cir. 1976); See also, Santor v.
A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 66, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965) (linking the concepts of
strict liability in tort and consumer expectations).
14. Use of the negligence based risk-utility test alone resembles a pure negligence analysis. Variations on the burden of proof, however, can shift the inquiry towards strict liability
notions. See infra text accompanying notes 72-76, 178-80.
15. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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broke on the car she was driving, causing the car to collapse. The
plaintiff sued the defendant-manufacturer, claiming that the defendant's failure to inspect the wooden spoke constituted negligence.16
Until MacPherson, the contract doctrine of privity prevented an injured plaintiff from recovering damages unless he was the immediate
purchaser from the defendant; here, the vehicle was sold by Buick to
a dealer who in turn sold it to the plaintiff.'7 Justice Cardozo, recognizing society's interest in imposing upon manufacturers a duty of
care toward all users of a product, held that Buick was liable, notwithstanding the privity doctrine. 18
While lowering the privity barrier in a negligence action for a
defective product greatly expanded the class of prospective plaintiffs,
a plaintiff choosing to sue under a negligence theory still had the
difficult burden of proving that the manufacturer was, in fact, negligent. Justice Traynor, concurring in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co.,19 noted that this was a substantial burden despite the very liberal application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine by the majority. In
Escola, the plaintiff, a waitress, was injured when a Coca-Cola bottle exploded in her hand as she placed the bottle in the refrigerator.20
The plaintiff brought suit, claiming that the defendant had been negligent in selling "bottles containing said beverage which on account
of excessive pressure of gas or by reason of some defect in the bottle
was dangerous . . . and likely to explode." 211 The plaintiff relied
solely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, offering no evidence of
specific acts of negligence. 22 Nevertheless, the court held for the
plaintiff. 23 Justice Traynor viewed such a broad interpretation of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine as dishonest because "[it is needlessly
circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose what
24
is in reality liability without negligence."
While the negligence rule approached that of strict products liability, the implied warranty of merchantability theory, another the16. See id. at 384-85, 111 N.E. at 1051.
17. Id.
The doctrine of privity was first espoused in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). It requires that a manufacturer's duty extends only to the
immediate purchaser.
18. See MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.
19. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)(Traynor, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 456, 150 P.2d at 437-38.
21. Id. at 456, 150 P.2d at 437.
22. Id. at 457, 150 P.2d at 438.
23. Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.
24. Id. at 463, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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ory relied upon in products liability actions, showed a similar devel-

opment. Under the implied warranty theory, liability arises from the
failure of the product to meet legitimate consumer expectations as to
performance. A plaintiff relying on this theory of liability has to
demonstrate only that the product purchased was of unmerchantable
quality. 5 Since no inquiry was made as to the manufacturer's conduct, an action under an implied warranty theory was very much
like strict liability. 6 This theory, however, was not without its
problems for the injured plaintiff. Since the theory was firmly based
in contract law, privity was a required element of the implied warranty cause of action. 27 It was not until 1960-forty-four years after
MacPherson-that the privity doctrine was struck down in the
landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.2" In Henningsen, the plaintiff was injured when the steering wheel of her car
malfunctioned, forcing the car off the road.29 Because the plaintiff
was not the immediate purchaser of the automobile the privity doctrine would have barred her suit.3 0 The New Jersey Supreme Court
held, however, that the obligation of the manufacturer should not be
based on the law of sales, but rather upon "the demands of social
justice."'3 1 Specifically, the court stated that a product carries an implied warranty of reasonable suitability, which accompanies the
product "into the hands of the ultimate consumer. 8 2
B.

The CaliforniaExperience

The development of both the negligence and implied warranty
theories provided two important concepts: First, lowering the privity
barrier 8 enabled a much broader class of plaintiffs to seek relief
than had been able to do so before. Second, the shift from a negligence theory to strict liability changed the focus of the inquiry from
the defendant's conduct to the quality of the product itselp 4 as did
25. See cases cited supra note 2.
26. See Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 594 n.8; see supra note 13.
27. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 97, at 655-56.
28. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
29. See id. at 369, 161 A.2d at 75.
30. See id. at 378-79, 161 A.2d at 80.
31. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 83 (quoting Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P.
633, 635 (1913)).
32. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
33. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916); Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 378-79, 161 A.2d 69, 80 (1960).
34. See Birnbaum, supra note 1 at 601; Keeton, The Meaning of Defect, supra note 1,
at 33.
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the implied warranty theory. 5 These notions provided the backdrop
for the first case that held a manufacturer strictly liable for a defectively designed product. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 6 the plaintiff was injured while using the lathe attachment to a
combination power tool. The piece of wood he was carving suddenly
flew out of the machine, striking him on the forehead and causing
serious injuries.3 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Traynor recognized that manufacturers are in the best position to control and eliminate the risks posed by defective products and that they are better
suited to bear the cost of a resulting injury.38 Hence, a "manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,'
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being." 39 This test implies that the plaintiff, in order to recover damages, would have to
establish that the product was defective simply because it could have
been designed in other, safer ways.4 0 Justice Traynor also suggested,
however, that consideration of a consumer's expectations may also be
relevant to the inquiry:
Implicit in the machine's presence on the market, however, was a
representation that it would safely do the jobs for which it was
built. Under these circumstances, it should not be controlling
whether plaintiff selected the machine because of the statements in
the brochure, or because of the machine's own appearance of excellence that belied the defect lurking beneath the surface, or because
he merely
assumed that it would safely do the jobs it was built to
1
4

do.

The duality evident in Justice Traynor's analysis, however, did
not establish a clear cut method of analyzing design defect cases. It
was not entirely clear, for example, which theory or theories another
plaintiff would be required to prove in a case similar to Greenman-risk-utility to the exclusion of consumer expectations, vice
35. The differences remaining focus on the theory of liability-more specifically, how
the reasonableness of the product is to be assessed. An implied warranty/strict liability analysis would look to consumer expectations, see infra text accompanying notes 67-69. A negligence analysis, however, looks to balancing the harm of the product versus its utility-the risk-

utility analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 70-76.
36. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
37. Id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
38. See id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
39. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
40. See id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
41. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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versa, or both tests. In addition, the court's use of the term "defect,"
without further explanation, did not suffice as an independent test
for establishing liability.42 The Greenman court, while imposing
strict liability, did not impose absolute liability.4 3 This distinction is
significant; it suggests that some acceptable degree of risk exists.
The question then becomes whether a product's design is reasonable
or whether reasonable alternatives to the existing product reduce the
risk level without impairing the usefulness of the product. 4 This crucial issue cannot easily be met through the use of the term "defect"
alone.
Within two years of the Greenman decision, Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A 45 provided for strict liability of the seller
for "any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer."' 4 6 Unreasonably dangerous, as the comments
to that section indicate, means dangerous "to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. 47
The Restatement (Second) formulation, however, was rejected
by the California Supreme Court in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.4
In Cronin, the plaintiff sustained serious injuries when the bread delivery truck he was driving was involved in an accident. Because of
the sudden deceleration of the truck, a metal hasp, designed to hold
the bread trays in place, broke. The trays were propelled toward the
front of the truck, striking the plaintiff, and causing him to go
through the windshield. On appeal, the California Supreme Court
42.

While defectively manufactured products can be compared to normally manufac-

tured products, design defects cannot be compared to standard products. Therefore, there must

be some external test or language which, when applied to the product, would indicate that
there was a "defect" resulting in manufacturer liability. See supra text accompanying notes 3-

4.
43. Absolute liability in this context would find the manufacturer liable for all harms
caused by the product, without regard to fault. In effect, the manufacturer would be an insurer
of all users of the product. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 1 at 600 n.32; Wade, On the
Nature, supra note 1 at 828.
44. This analysis, suggested by the Greenman court, is at the heart of the risk-utility test
widely used today. See supra text accompanying note 5; see infra text accompanying notes 70-

76.
45.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

46. Id. § 402A (1).
47. Id. § 402A, Comment . This follows the strict liability/implied warranty/consumer
expectations terminology evident in Greenman.
48. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
49. Id. at 124, 501 P.2d at 1155, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
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was troubled by the "unreasonably dangerous" modifier to the term
defect. First, the court concluded that using the modifier "unreasonable" to describe a product introduces the question of reasonable
conduct which "rings of negligence" and has a "negligence complexion." 50 Second, the court stated that the modifier, if taken literally
by the trier of fact, would appear to impose a dual burden to show
not only the existence of a defect but also that the defect rendered
the product unreasonably dangerous.51 Finally, the court recognized
that use of the unreasonable danger test could result in a situation
where there would be no liability, no matter how dangerous a product might be, as long as5 2a consumer's expectations of product performance had been met.
Cronin's rejection of the "unreasonably dangerous" modifier, in
reality, left California with no test at all.53 It was up to the court in
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.54 to try once again to create a workable test for design defect cases. In Barker, the plaintiff-employee
was seriously injured at a construction site when he was operating a
high-lift loader while substituting for the loader's regular operator.
While operating the loader on sharply sloping terrain, the plaintiff
was forced to jump off the loader when it began to tip over, and was
injured in the fall. 5 At trial, the plaintiff contended that the loader
was defectively designed, arguing that the loader should have been
equipped with outriggers, a roll bar, and seat belts. The defendantmanufacturer denied that the loader was defectively designed, arguing instead that the injury had occurred because the loader was misused. According to the defendant, an experienced operator would
have known that a high-lift loader should not be used on steep terrain.5 The trial court had instructed the jury "that strict liability for
a defect in design of a product is based on a finding that the product
was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use . . . .,, The jury
subsequently returned a verdict for the defendant-manufacturer and
the plaintiff appealed, arguing that Cronin had dispensed with the
50. Id. at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
51. Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442; see also Glass v. Ford Motor
Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (Law Div. 1973) (adopting the Restatement (Second)
formulation but eliminating the "unreasonably dangerous" modifier).
52. 8 Cal. 3d at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
53. See Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 603.
54. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
55. Id. at 419, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
56. Id. at 419-21, 573 P.2d at 447-48, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30.
57. Id. at 417, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
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"unreasonably dangerous" requirement.58 The defendant, however,

maintained that the word "defect" alone provided insufficient guidance to a jury and that the "unreasonably dangerous" modifier
should be used. 59 The Barker court, in holding for the plaintiff, reaf-

firmed Cronin,"° although it was not prepared to eliminate consumer
expectations from the design defect analysis. 6 ' The court reasoned
that the consumer expectations test, as then envisioned, was a maximum test of liability; why, the court questioned, couldn't the test still
be used as a minimum test for liability?6 2 In this mode, an injured
plaintiff would recover when a product, dangerous or not, failed to
meet the expectations of the ordinary consumer when used in a reasonably forseeable manner.6 For cases where a dangerous product
met consumer expectations or where there was no evidence of consumer expectations as to the performance of the product,"64 the court
added another test, risk-utility analysis, to the consumer expectations
test. 65 This "two-pronged" defect test, as it is now known, was formulated as follows:
[I]n design defect cases, a court may properly instruct a jury that a
product is defective in design if (1) the plaintiff proves that the
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner,
or (2) the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately
caused injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.66
58. Id. at 422-24, 573 P.2d at 449-50, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32.
59. Id. at 427, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234. Defendant further argued that
Cronin was limited to manufacturing defect cases and, therefore, disapproval of the "unreasonably dangerous" language should extend only to manufacturing defect cases and not to design
defect cases. Id. at 423-24, 573 P.2d at 449-50, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32. The Barker court
rejected this argument, finding no such distinction in the language of Cronin. Id. at 425-26,
573 P.2d at 451-52, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233-34.
60. See id. at 417, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
61. The court noted a long acceptance of the consumer expectations test in California
law, beginning with Greenman'sacceptance of consumer expectations as a reflection of implied
warranty principles. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
62. Id. at 425-26 n.7, 573 P.2d at 451 n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.7.
63. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
64. Both of these situations should be contrasted with the case where consumer expectations exist concerning the performance of a product and the expectations are not met. For
example, a consumer would expect that an automobile tire would not break apart at normal
driving speeds, or that in the ordinary operation of a carving knife, the blade would not separate from the handle. See infra note 108.
65. See 20 Cal. 3d at 430-31, 573 P.2d at 454-55, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37.
66. Id. at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (emphasis omitted).
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The first prong of this two-part test, the consumer expectations
test, is really nothing more than a simplified version of the previously
rejected 67 Restatement (Second) definition, which measures a product's defectiveness in terms of the expectations of an ordinary consumer who purchases it. 8 When the plaintiff proves that the product
fails to meet consumer expectations, the defendant-manufacturer is
held liable; thus, the test provides a minimum standard that no product can fall below.69
If the product does meet consumer expectations or where evidence of consumer expectations is not available, then the second
prong, or risk-utility analysis, comes into play. Under one author's
view, adopted by the California courts, liability attaches "if a reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the time of trial
outweighed the benefits of the way the product was so designed and
marketed." 70 This balancing test requires the consideration of many
factors. Dean Wade has proposed a list of seven factors for use in
the analysis:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility
to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it
will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet
the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care
in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent
in the product and their avoidability, because of general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
67. See Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A comment i(1965); see supra text accompanying note 47.
69. The consumer expectations test as formulated is not without criticism. See Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 617-18.
70. Keeton, The Meaning of Defect, supra note 1, at 38 (emphasis in original).
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insurance. 1a
71. Wade, On the Nature, supra note 1, at 837-38 (footnote omitted). Other commentators have set forth their own tests. Professor Fischer, for example, has proposed that a court
should use a more extensive test:
I. Risk Spreading
A. From the point of view of consumer.
I. Ability of consumer to bear loss.
2. Feasibility and effectiveness of self-protective measures.
a. Knowledge of risk.
b. Ability to control danger.
c. Feasibility of deciding against use of product.
B. From point of view of manufacturer.
1. Knowledge of risk.
2. Accuracy of prediction of losses.
3. Size of losses.
4. Availability of insurance.
5. Ability of manufacturer to self-insure.
6. Effect of increased prices on industry.
7. Public necessity for the product.
8. Deterrent effect on the development of new products.
II. Safety Incentive
A. Likelihood of future product improvement.
B. Existence of additional precautions that can presently be taken.
C. Availability of safer substitutes.
Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 359 (1974). Professor Shapo's proposal includes thirteen elements:
1. The nature of the product as a vehicle for creation of persuasive advertising
images, and the relationship of this factor to the ability of sellers to generate product representations in mass media;
2. The specificity of representations and other communications related to the
product;
3. The intelligence and knowledge of consumers generally and of the disappointed
consumer in particular;
4. The use of sales appeals based on specific consumer characteristics;
5. The consumer's actions during his encounter with the product, evaluated in the
context of his general knowledge and intelligence and of his actual knowledge about
the product or that which reasonably could be ascribed to him;
6. The implications of the proposed decision for public health and safety generally,
and especially for social programs that provide coverage for accidental injury and
personal disability;
7. The incentives that the proposed decision would provide to make the product
safer;
8. The cost to the producer and other sellers of acquiring the relevant information
about the crucial product characteristic and the cost of supplying it to persons in the
position of the disappointed party;
9. The availability of the relevant information about the crucial product characteristics to persons in the position of the disappointed party and the cost to them of
acquiring it;
10. The effects of the proposed decision on the availability of data that bear on
consumer choice of goods and services;
11. Generally, the likely effects on prices and quantities of goods sold;
12. The costs and benefits attendant to determination of the legal issues involved,
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In applying the Wade factors, a complication arises from the
tension between negligence and strict liability principles. Since the
manufacturer is not going to be held to absolute liability for an injury resulting from a product's design, it is important to focus on the
critical factors to determine liability. On the one hand, under negligence principles, the inquiry focuses on the design of the product
when the design was undertaken by the manufacturer. This approach would consider the manufacturer's design choices at the time
of the design-more specifically, what factors were weighed by the
manufacturer at that time. 2
In contrast, under strict liability principles, the risk-utility analysis is applied to the design of the product as it is seen at the time of
sale. 3 Under this test, the inquiry is on the product's reasonableness
at the time it was sold, regardless of what possible intervening technologies were present between the design and the sale of the product.7 4 Currently, both California" and New Jersey76 follow this latter test.
either by private litigation or by collective social judgment;
13. The effects of the proposed decision on wealth distribution, both between sellers and consumers and among sellers.
Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal
Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1370-71 (1974). Professors
Montgomery and Owen have proposed a test that includes only four parts:
(1) The cost of injuries attributable to the condition of the product about which
the plaintiff complains-the pertinent accident costs.
(2) The incremental cost of marketing the product without the offending condition-the manufacturer's safety cost.
(3) The loss of functional and psychological utility occasioned by the elimination
of the offending condition-the public's safety cost.
(4) The respective abilities of the manufacturer and the consumer to (a) recognize
the risks of the condition, (b) reduce such risks, and (c) absorb or insure against
such risks-the allocation of risk awareness and control between the manufacturer
and the consumer.
Montgomery & Owen, supra note 6, at 818. See also Dickerson, Products Liability: How
Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 331 (1967); Vetri, Products Liability:
The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 OR. L. REv. 293, 304-12 (1975).
72. This view finds clear and strong support in the UPLA, supra note 6. See infra text
accompanying notes 172-80.
73. See Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 622; Keeton, The Meaning of Defect, supra note 1,
at 37-38.
74, See Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 622.
75. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
76, See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 170, 406 A.2d 140,
149-50 (1979).
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN NEW JERSEY

Through the Barker test, the California Supreme Court has
provided a coherent, step-by-step guide for lower courts to follow in
design defect cases. During the evolution from Greenman, decided in
1963, to Barker, decided in 1978 the New Jersey courts essentially

relied on the Restatement (Second) section 402A test.7 Since Daw%7 8 importance is appreciated best in light of
son v. Chrysler Corp.'s
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 79 and since Suter

rests largely on the dual tests of consumer expectations and riskutility analysis first developed through California opinions, 0 the following analysis of New Jersey case law will begin with Cepeda v.
Cumberland Engineering Co.,81 the first New Jersey case to explicitly recognize the risk-utility factors inherent in a design defect
82

case.

In Cepeda, the plaintiff lost four fingers when his hand was
caught in a "pelletizing" machine from which the safety guard had
been removed. 3 The plaintiff claimed that the machine was defectively designed because the defendant had failed to equip the product with an interlock assembly mechanism designed to prevent the
machine from operating when the safety guard was removed. The
plaintiff contended that normal operation of the machine frequently
required the removal of the guard; thus, the defendant should have
expected that the machine would be operated without the guard, and
77. RETATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The New Jersey courts have
applied § 402A in a number of different situations. See Brody v. Overlook Hospital, 66 N.J.
448, 451, 332 A.2d 596, 597 (1975) (viral serum hepatitis); Realmuto v. Straub Motors, 65
N.J. 336, 343, 322 A.2d 440, 443 (1974) (carburetor linkage); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63
N.J. 130, 151, 305 A.2d 412, 423 (1973) (truck tire); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J.
402, 407-08, 290 A.2d 281, 284 (1972) (punch-press); Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J.
585, 595, 258 A.2d 697, 702 (1969) (hair permanent); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick &
Gamon Meter Co., 51 N.J. 130, 136, 238 A.2d 169, 172 (1968) (water meter); Turner v.
International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 286, 336 A.2d 62, 67 (Law Div. 1975)
(truck cab); cf. Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (Law Div. 1973)
(dispensing with unreasonably dangerous modifier, but otherwise continuing to use § 402A).
Other recent decisions in New Jersey in the strict liability area, although not mentioning §
402A, are generally consistent with the principles enunciated therein. See e.g., Moraca v. Ford
Motor Co., 66 N.J. 454, 460, 332 A.2d 599, 602 (1975) (steering mechanism); Scanlon v.
General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 590-91, 326 A.2d 673, 677 (1974) (carburetor linkage).
78. 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
79. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 36-71.
81. 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
82. Id. at 171-76, 386 A.2d at 825-27.
83. Id. at 161, 386 A.2d at 820.
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should have designed the product accordingly. The trial court used
language from both section 402A and implied warranty theory to
8 4 and,
instruct the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
on appeal by the defendant, the appellate division held "that the evidence compelled the conclusion as a matter of law that the machine
as delivered was free of design defect. ' 85 The court reasoned that "if
the safety device provided with the machine was not used, the manufacturer 'cannot be held responsible for unforseeable negligence on
the part of third parties in operating or permitting operation of the
equipment without the device.' "86 On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, however, the court applied section 402A and the
Wade-Keeton prudent manufacturer's test and ruled that the potential dangerousness of a machine's design was a jury question to be
resolved by considering whethei" a reasonably prudent manufacturer,
after balancing the risks versus the utility of the machine, would release the machine into the stream of commerce. 87 Under this standard, any evidence of design risk at the time of sale would be imputed to the manufacturer at the time of the manufacture of the
machine. 88 In a lengthy analysis, the majority recognized the increasing acceptance of the risk-utility analysis, 9 and noted the general criticism of the Cronin decision,90 which relied solely on section
402A. The Cepeda court, unwilling to completely abandon the Restatement (Second) language previously followed by New Jersey
courts, instructed the court on remand to incorporate into the riskutility jury instruction consideration of whether the product's defective condition was unreasonably dangerous.9 1
This jury instruction, however, did not last long;92 shortly thereafter, in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co.,98 the court
9
recognized the undesirability of using the section 402A language. 4
84. Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 162, 386 A.2d at 821.
(quoting 138 N.J. Super. 344, 351, 351 A.2d 22, 26 (Law Div. 1976)).
at 173-75, 386 A.2d at 826-27.
at 163, 386 A.2d at 821.
at 171-75, 386 A.2d at 825-27.
at 171 n.4, 386 A.2d at 825 n.4.

91. Id. at 179-80, 386 A.2d at 829.
92. This result was inevitable; by using the strict liability/consumer expectatiols language of § 402A with the risk-utility test, which is based on negligence principles, the two
dissimilar principles were proposed to be used together as one single theory. See id. at 174-75,

386 A.2d at 827. For a discussion of these principles see supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
93.
94.

81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
See id. at 174-77, 406 A.2d 152-153.
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In Suter, the plaintiff was injured when his hand was caught in the
cylinders of an industrial sheet metal rolling machine designed to
take flat sheets of metal and curve them into cylinders. While the
machine was in the neutral position, the plaintiff reached into the
rollers to try to remove a piece of slag. As he reached in, however,
his body grazed the gear lever, activating the machine's rollers and
injuring his hand. 5 Plaintiff alleged that the rolling machine was
defectively designed, claiming that either a rotary guard should have
been placed around the lever, or the lever should have been located
higher up on the machine.96 Either of these design alternatives, the
plaintiff argued, would have prevented accidental activation of the
rollers.9
In a confusing opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court first approved the trial court's jury instruction, despite its nonconformance
with the language of the instructions set forth in Cepeda.98 The
court then discussed the development of strict liability principles in
New Jersey, noting that in certain defect cases, the nature of the
alleged defect is clear. Although the court did not expressly label
such "clear" defects as manufacturing defects, it characterized a defect as an "[imperfect material, a defective weld, or some physical
damage in the product." 99 Next, the court stated: "We perceive that
the only additional question to be put to the jury in a case involving
a design defect, vis-li-vis other defects, is whether the product design
was improper."100 The court noted that in some design defect cases,
it is "self-evident that the product is not reasonably suitable and safe
and fails to perform, contrary to the user's reasonable expectation
that it would 'safely do the jobs for which it was built.' "101 This test
95. Id. at 156-57, 406 A.2d at 142-43.
96. Id. at 157, 406 A.2d at 143.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 168, 406 A.2d at 149. The trial court's jury instruction consisted of only four
elements:
(1) that the product had not been reasonably fit for the ordinary use for which it
was intended;
(2) that the defect arose out of defendant's design of the machine;
(3) that the defect proximately caused plaintiff's injury or damage; and
(4) that [the] plaintiff was a reasonably forseeable consumer or user of the
product.
Id. The Suter court nonetheless approved the trial court's instruction because in its view it
"generally conformed with the approach developed in our case law." Id.
99. Id. at 170, 406 A.2d at 150. These are all examples, of course, of manufacturing
defects.
100. Id.
101. 81 N.J. at 171, 406 A.2d at 150 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59
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would appear to be the New Jersey equivalent of the consumer ex-

pectations test articulated earlier in Barker.102 Likewise, application
of the Suter test could result in liability for the defendant if a plaintiff could prove that his reasonable consumer expectations had not
been met. The court then determined that in cases where it was not
self-evident that the product failed to meet a reasonable consumer's
expectations, a jury instruction should be added that focuses on the
manufacturer's reasonableness in placing the product into the marketplace in its present design versus the allegedly safer alternative
design.103 The Suter court then departed from Cepeda by discarding
the "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" language in the
risk-utility instruction adopted just fifteen months earlier, ° 4 reasoning that such language requires a plaintiff to establish not only the
presence of a defect, but also that the defect created an unreasonably dangerous condition.10 5
The sudden departure from the Cepeda precedent notwithstanding, the focus here is on the Suter court's proposed jury instructions

in a design defect case,108 where consumer expectations and risk-utility theories are to be submitted cumulatively.10 7 In Barker, the consumer expectations portion of the two-pronged test could apply only
if the defect was self-evident. The risk-utility analysis, however,
could be used if the defect was not self-evident or if the plaintiff
chose to use only the second part of the test. 1 8 The Barker test,
Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963)).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
103. 81 N.J. at 171, 406 A.2d at 150. Despite the Suter court's focus on the reasonableness of the manufacturer instead of the reasonableness of the product, the test is generally
consistent with the risk-utility analysis enunciated in Cepeda. See supra text accompanying
notes 88-91; see also Wade, On the Nature, supra note 1, at 836-37. It is arguable, however,
that the change from the focus on the product to the manufacturer's conduct represents more
of a burden to the plaintiff, because negligence on the part of the manufacturer must be
proved.
104. See 81 N.J. at 174-76, 406 A.2d at 152-53. As the concurrence points out, the
Suter court's rejection of the use of "unreasonably dangerous" is "remarkable." Id. at 183-84,
406 A.2d at 157 (Clifford, J., concurring). The Cepeda court, in a unanimous decision barely
fifteen months earlier, reviewed the California decision in Cronin which rejected the use of the
unreasonably dangerous language, yet the Cepeda court continued to use the unreasonably
dangerous language in its jury instruction. See id.
105. Id. at 174-76, 406 A.2d at 152-53.
106. Id. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
107. See id. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153. The concurrence refers to this as "a mixture of the
apples of warranty with the oranges of negligence." Id. at 184, 406 A.2d at 157 (Clifford, J.,
concurring).
108. This situation would arise where the product's defect is so obvious that a manufacturer could claim that the consumer had knowledge of it, as for example, when a lawn mower
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therefore, is posed in the disjunctive, i.e., either the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility test is to be instructed to the jury.10
Under Suter, however, a trial court must generally instruct the jury
using the language of the consumer expectations test, 11 0 and then
add the risk-utility charge, if it is needed. 11 This is evident from the
court's proposed instructions, the first of which is premised on the
consumer expectations test:
When submitting the case to a jury, the court should charge generally that a manufacturer has an obligation to distribute products
which are reasonably fit, suitable and safe for their intended or
foreseeable purposes. If that obligation is violated and a user or
others who may be expected to come in contact with the product
are injured as a result, then the manufacturer is responsible for the
ensuing damages. Design defect cases are covered as well within
that context.

1

2

Next, the court recommended that risk-utility principles be charged
as follows:
In those design defect situations in which the defect is not selfevident, the trial court should also charge the jury on whether the
manufacturer, it being deemed to have known of the harmful propensity of the product, acted as a reasonably prudent one. Depending on the proofs, the trial court should explain pertinent factors
11
related to the determination of reasonable prudence. 1
When the Suter approach is compared with that of Barker, it becomes evident that the former is closely patterned after the Barker
is used to cut grass where small stones are present. The lawn mower could kick out a stone,
injuring the consumer; using only consumer expectations, the manufacturer could escape liability by claiming the consumer would expect a stone to kick out. By making consumer expectations a minimum test for liability, however, a consumer could still use risk-utility principles to
prove that the lawn mower was defectively designed in that a better product could have been
made without a decrease in utility. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 63-71.
110. If the defect was self-evident to the consumer, the consumer expectations instruction would of course be included, but it would also be included in the jury instruction if the
defect was not self-evident. See 81 N.J. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
111. If the defect had not been self-evident, the court would use a jury instruction consisting of both consumer expectations and risk-utility theories. If the defect was self-evident to
the consumer, however, the consumer expectations instruction would appear to apply to the
exclusion of the risk-utility instruction. The latter situation appears to formulate the consumer
expectations test as a maximum test for liability, the exact circumstances the Barker court
wanted to avoid. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
112. 81 N.J. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
113. Id. (emphasis added).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 12
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:1297

test,114 although the Suter test becomes an unworkable formulation
because it is cumulative. For example, in a risk-utility case, a court
applying the Suter test would have to charge generally whether the
product was "reasonably fit, suitable and safe for [its] intended or
forseeable purposes,"-in effect requiring the trier of fact to use the
consumer expectations test to determine whether the burden of proving the risk-utility factors had been met. 115
Dawson v. Chrysler Corp.116 decided by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals fourteen months after the state court decision in Suter,
exemplifies the unworkability of the Suter test. Dawson, a police officer, was seriously injured on September 7, 1974 when his 1974
Dodge Monaco patrol car slid off a rain-soaked highway and struck
a steel pole at the left rear wheel well. The force of the impact
caused the steel pole to rip through the body of the car, crushing
Dawson between the seat and the "header" area of the roof located
just above the windshield. Dawson dislocated his left hip and ruptured his fifth and sixth cervical vertebrae and, as a result, became a
quadraplegic, requiring constant medical attention. 17
Dawson, his wife, and their son brought suit against the
Chrysler Corporation, the manufacturer of the vehicle, in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. Chrysler had the case removed to
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on diversity grounds and subsequently transferred the case to
the federal district court in New Jersey.118 The plaintiffs, whose
claims were based on strict liability and implied warranty theories,
alleged that the patrol car was defective because it did not have a
full, continuous steel frame extending through the door panels, and a
cross-member running through the floor board between the posts (located at the juncture of the front and rear doors) of the vehicle.
They claimed that if the vehicle had been designed this way, the
collision between the automobile and the steel pole would have re114. Professors Birnbaum and Twerski have interpreted Suter as a two-prong test, patterned closely after Barker. Birnbaum supra note 1, at 624; A. Twerski, Products Liability
Treatise § 7.06 (unpublished manuscript 1981) (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review).
115. This language served to further confuse the test for design defects. See Birnbaum,
supra note 1, at 620. In his concurrence, Justice Clifford noted: "I for one quite honestly do
not understand how the trial judges and jurors are to go about their business; and if I do not, I
venture to say there may be some of them who will share my dullness of comprehension." 81
N.J. at 184, 406 A.2d at 157 (Clifford, J., concurring).
116. 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
117. Id. at 953-54.
118. Id. at 954 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1441(a) (1976)).
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suited in only slight penetration of the pole into the passenger compartment and only slight injury to Dawson." 9
In response, Chrysler first argued that it had no duty to produce
a "crashproof" vehicle.1 20 Next, Chrysler argued that since the 1974
Dodge Monaco complied with all federal vehicle safety standards,
the vehicle could not be held to be defectively designed.1 2, In addition, Chrysler contended that its design, using a noncontinuous
frame, was more desirable than the alternative proposed by the
plaintiffs for at least three reasons: First, since most vehicle crashes
are to the front end, a noncontinuous frame would better absorb the
impact of the crash and decrease the rate of deceleration on the occupants of the vehicle than would a continuous frame. Second, the
design alternative proposed by the plaintiffs would render the vehicle
between 200 and 250 pounds heavier and $300.00 more expensive
than the model then marketed.1 22 Finally, Chrysler proved that the
1974 Dodge Monaco's unibody construction was stronger than comparable Ford and Chevrolet vehicles. 2
Chrysler moved for a directed verdict upon the conclusion of all
testimony; the district judge denied the motion.12 4 The jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiffs, finding that the body structure of the
1974 Dodge Monaco was defective and unreasonably dangerous, 2
and that Chrysler's failure to use the alternative design proposed by
the plaintiffs caused Dawson to sustain injuries more severe than
otherwise would have been incurred.' 26 The jury award included
$2,064,863.19 for Mr. Dawson's expenses, disability, and pain and
suffering and $60,000 to Mrs. Dawson for loss of consortium and
loss of services. After entry of this judgment, Chrysler moved for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and alternatively for a new
119. Id.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 571.1 (1979)).
Id.

123. Id. The factors Chrysler introduced are but some of the proofs in a proper riskutility analysis rebuttal to plaintiff's alternative design.
124.

Id. at 954-55.

125. Id. at 955. Although the trial court's jury instruction included the "unreasonably
dangerous" language, for purposes of this note it was harmless error because the plaintiff won

in the lower court, and therefore met the burdensome "unreasonably dangerous" test.
126. Id. at 955. Although the use of the alternative design could have prevented Richard

Dawson's injuries, the critical inquiry is whether the utility of that design outweighs the risks
of the design, or, alternatively, whether the utility of the present design used by Chrysler is
outweighed by the risks of the present design because the alternative design would have
avoided the injuries to the plaintiff with no overall increase in risk. See infra text accompanying notes 147-55.
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trial. The court denied both motions. 127
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, applying New
Jersey law, affirmed the district court judgment notwithstanding
Chrysler's contentions that the plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to
establish that the 1974 Dodge Monaco was defective and unreasonably dangerous or that Chrysler breached an implied warranty of
fitness. 128 The court first recognized that under the law of New
Jersey, the governing principles of strict liability and the implied
warranty theory are identical. 29 The court then proceeded to apply
the facts to the law governing products liability design defect litigation in New Jersey, namely, the risk-utility analysis enunciated in
Cepeda 30° and further developed in Suter.""1 After reviewing the evidence presented, the court concluded that the record was sufficient to
sustain the jury's determination that Chrysler had manufactured a
defectively designed automobile. The court stated:
The jury was not required to ascertain that all of the factors
enumerated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Cepeda weighed
in favor of the Dawsons in order to find the patrol car defective.
Rather, it need only to have reasonably concluded, after balancing
these factors, that, at the time Chrysler distributed the 1974 Monaco, the car was "not reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes. .. .
In an unusual conclusion,138 the court remarked: "[A]Ithough we affirm the judgment of the district court, we do so with uneasiness
regarding the consequences of our decision and of the decisions of
other courts throughout the country in cases of this kind."'
The court's misgivings about the decision it felt compelled to
reach reflects its concern with a number of problems it anticipated
127. 630 F.2d at 955.
128. Id. Chrysler also had contended that it had no duty to manufacture a vehicle sufficient to withstand this particular type of collision, but the court recognized that the manufacturer must consider accidents as among the "intended" uses of its products. Id. at 956 (quoting
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976)). For an elaboration of this principle, see
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-03 (8th Cir. 1968).
129. 630 F.2d at 955 (citing Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 733 (3d Cir. 1976)).
130. 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978); see 630 F.2d at 957. For a discussion of Cepeda
see supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
131. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); see 630 F.2d at 956-57. For a discussion of
Suter, see supra text accompanying notes 103-13.
132. 630 F.2d at 959 (citation omitted) (quoting Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach.
Co., 81 N.J. 150, 169, 406 A.2d 140, 149 (1979)).
133. See Nat'l L.J., Sept. 29, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
134. 630 F.2d at 962.
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would arise from the outcome of the case. The court noted that the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,13 provided that
compliance with the Act would not exempt a manufacturer from design defect liability under state common law. 13 This, the court pre-

dicted, could lead individual juries in various states to impose different design requirements and standards on automobile manufacturers.
Such disparate treatment, in turn, would effectively make the automobile industry insurers of a vast number of auto accident victims. 137 The court also feared that the problem of disparate treatment would make it impractical and perhaps impossible for the
automobile industry to alter an automobile's design in response to an
adverse jury verdict, reasoning that another jury in a subsequent
case might find the new design defective for a different reason.Iu
Furthermore, the court observed that establishing automobile safety
requirements on a case by case basis would significantly affect national economic goals such as weight reduction of automobiles to
conserve energy and competitive pricing to curb rising costs of
automobiles.13 9 In conclusion, the court called for Congressional intervention, urging that the legislature 0was best suited to evaluate and
14
possibly change the present system.

The Dawson court raised a number of issues important to the
future of design defect litigation.14 1 Nevertheless, the court, in ap-

plying New Jersey law, affirmed the district court decision when it
should have remanded it. The main flaw in the court's analysis re-

sults from the use of the Suter test 14 2 which, as Justice Clifford ac-

curately predicted, presents the trier of fact with an unworkable
test.14a The Dawson court summarized its perception of New Jersey
law in the following passage:
If at the time the seller distributes a product, it is not reasonably
fit, suitable and safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable pur135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
well as an
140.

141.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1976).
See 630 F.2d at 962.
Id. at 962.
Id.
See id. at 962-63. The alternate design would add a hefty $300.00 to the cost, as
additional 200-250 pounds to the weight of each vehicle. Id. at 954.
Id. at 963.

There is, for example, much debate concerning the significance, if any, that should

be given to compliance with the federal automobile safety standards. See, e.g., Claybrook,
Auto Protection: Beyond FederalStandards, TRIAL, Nov. 1980, at 38.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 95-115.
143. Suter, 81 N.J. at 184, 406 A.2d at 157 (Clifford, J., concurring).
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poses so that users or others who may be expected to come in contact with the product are injured as a result thereof,
then the seller
144
shall be responsible for the ensuing damages.
As noted earlier, this language, taken from Suter, amounts to the
first prong of the Barker inquiry-the consumer expectations test.
Yet the Dawson court utilized this language as the test the jury had
to meet in its balancing of the risk-utility factors, thereby rejecting
Chrysler's contention that the plaintiff had not presented enough evidence to prevail under a risk-utility analysis, i.e., to prove that the
alternative design proposed would, on balance, be preferable to the
existing design. 146 It was this use of the Suter test that led the court
to its consternation over the problems inherent in applying New
Jersey's test for design defect.
If the Dawson court had applied a defect inquiry similar to that
used in Barker, it would have begun its analysis with the consumer
expectations test. It then would have determined that it was inapplicable to Dawson since the plaintiff had no consumer expectations
1 47
concerning the interior design of his vehicle prior to the accident.
Next, the court would have applied the risk-utility analysis, which
enumerates the Wade-Keeton balancing factors. 48 Use of both steps
of the defect analysis would have led to the conclusion that plaintiffs
had not met their burden of proof.149 Although the plaintiffs submitted a feasible alternative design, they failed to prove, in view of all
the relevant Wade-Keeton factors, the superiority of their proposed
design to Chrysler's existing design. 50 Under this process, plaintiffs
would have been required to balance the additional cost and weight
of their proposed design against national and economic goals and the
possibility that their alternative design might lead to more serious
144. 630 F.2d at 956 (quoting Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150,
169, 406 A.2d 140, 149 (1979) (footnote omitted)).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69, 101-02.
146. See 630 F.2d at 959; see supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
147. See supra note 64 and text accompanying notes 106-12.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 71, 88-90.
149. This approach differs from that taken in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,
573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), which provided that the plaintiff need only show
that the injury was proximately caused by the product; the burden would then be on the defendant to prove that, in light of the relevant factors, the product was not defective. See id. at
431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. No such shifting of the burden was contemplated
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Suter.
150. This is really nothing more than a negligence analysis, albeit with forseeability of
the risk of harm imputed to the manufacturer at the time of sale. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
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injuries in more commonplace head-on collisions- 15 1 all factors that
the court feared were not being dealt with under current products

liability law.1 52 The Dawson court would then have affirmed the district court decision only if it had been satisfied that these factors had

not undermined the feasibility of the proposed alternative design.
The proper analysis, therefore, would mitigate the anticipated problem of individual juries setting varying standards, and would provide

adequate consideration of the relevant factors for determining, on a
nationwide scale, the preferability of a proposed design over the ex-

the
isting-design. In this way, a plaintiff would succeed only when
3
court was satisfied that an alternative design was preferable.1

Ultimately, if the proper analysis had been utilized, with the
burden of proof on the plaintiff, the Dawson court would have found
that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the

superiority of their alternative design despite proof of its feasibility.' " The court, therefore, would have reversed the district court

decision, finding for the defendants instead of the plaintiffs. Conversely, if the burden of proof could have been shifted to the defen-

dant, as the Barker court had done, 5 the plaintiff would have had
to propose only a feasible alternative design; the burden would then
have been on the defendant to prove that the alternative design was

not preferable to the existing design. 56 With the burden of proof on
the defendant, the Dawson court could have decided the case in any

one of three ways. If the court had determined that the existing design was preferable to the proposed design, then it would have sus151. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
152. See 630 F.2d at 962-63.
153. Indeed, most courts do recognize risk-utility analysis as the proper theory for deciding design defect cases. See cases cited supra note 5.
154. In Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978), the plaintiff
alleged that an aircraft manufactured by the defendant was defectively designed, in that the
existing design employed a carburetor which could ice-up under certain conditions, causing the
aircraft's engines to stall. The plaintiff offered alternative designs consisting of either a fuel
injection system or a carburetor heating system, both of which the court acknowledged were
feasible. The court held "that plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence that a reasonably
prudent manufacturer who was aware of the risks of carburetor icing would not have designed
this model of aircraft with a carbureted engine, or that substitution of a fuel injected engine
was practicable. On this ground alone, defendant is entitled to a new trial." Id. at 68, 577 P.2d
at 1328 (footnote omitted).
Another significant factor is that the Oregon Supreme Court formulated the risk-utility
test in terms of the reasonableness of the manufacturer, exactly as the Suter formulation. See
supra note 103 and accompanying text.
155. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
156. Id.
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tained Chrysler's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
If the court had determined that insufficient evidence existed at trial
to sustain the defendant's burden of proof, the court either could
have affirmed the district court decision or remanded the case if the
jury instruction had been inadequate.
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

The difficulties encountered by the Dawson court are common
to many courts throughout the country that are struggling with riskutility and consumer expectations principles, and their foundation in
negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability theories.157 It is apparent that the Suter test, applied by the Dawson court, led the
Dawson court to affirm the district court's decision, to the detriment
of the defendant manufacturer. The Suter test likewise could lead
another court to render a verdict unfair to a defendant-manufacturer. The California Supreme Court recently recognized the
problems inherent in a consumer expectations/risk-utility design defect analysis. In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,158 the court acknowledged that, in view of the "confusion" the Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp.159 court had created, it had to clearly set forth the factors that the lower courts should consider in formulating jury instructions.160 The court also decided that it had to shift the burden
of proof to the defendant to overcome "the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action."161
At the outset, New Jersey state courts and the federal courts
157. See, e.g., Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). In Turner, the Texas Supreme Court not only rejected the use of a bifurcated consumer expectations/ risk-utility test, but also rejected the use of each test independently. See id. at 849-51.
The court rejected the consumer expectations test because of "the inclusiveness of the idea
that jurors would know what ordinary consumers would expect in the consumption or use of a
product, or that jurors would or could apply any standard or test outside that of their own
experiences and expectations." Id. at 851. The court likewise rejected the use of risk-utility
factors due to the "difficulty of formulating a series of specific factors which the fact finders
will be instructed to balance . . . ." Id. at 849.
The court instead proposed the use of a jury instruction focusing on whether the product
is "unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product
and the risk involved in its use." Id. at 847 n.1. It is submitted that this test, which does not
allow for any further elaboration in a jury instruction, is even more unworkable than the Suter
test since it badly mixes doctrines of strict liability and negligence without further explanation.
See supra text accompanying notes 98-115.
158. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
159. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
160. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 417, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
161. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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called upon to interpret New Jersey law could overcome the confusion of the Suter test by recognizing it for what it is-a consumer
expectations/risk-utility test patterned after Barker16 2 -and by applying it as the Barker test is applied. This would accomplish the
goals of the New Jersey Supreme Court-namely, establishment of a
minimum liability threshhold below which no product can fall, and,
for most design defect cases, application of a complete risk-utility
analysis that incorporates all the revelant Wade-Keeton factors. This
analysis requires either that the plaintiff prove that the alternative
design is both feasible and more desirable than the allegedly defective product, analyzed as of the time of sale, or that the plaintiff just
prove that the injury was proximately caused by the product defect,
with the burden then on the defendant to prove that the product was
not defective as of the time of sale.
Notwithstanding the clarity of the Barker design defect test,
Barker should not be viewed as the ultimate evolution of the design
defect analysis.163 A legislative solution, based solely on risk-utility
principles, could be applied. Such an approach would overcome the
remaining judicial confusion of the negligence-strict liability/warranty analysis and produce uniformity among the states adopting it.
Also, such an approach would more closely approximate the balancing test that is at the heart of the design defect analysis.'"
The Model Uniform Product Liability Act 165 (UPLA) embraces
this approach, subject to the burden of proof switching to the defendant 6 6 and presents a logical, coherent test for design defect
162. See supra note 114.
163. Because the formulation of the risk-utility test can still differ among the various
states, the Dawson court's concerns that different juries could impose conflicting standards is
still very real. This is another possible reason why, in addition to the formulation of the Suter
test, the Dawson court felt compelled to ask Congress to enact a legislative solution to the
problem. 630 F.2d at 962-63.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 172-80.
165. UPLA, supra note 6, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979); see id. § 104(B) Analysis, 44
Fed. Reg. at 62,724.
166. The impact of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant has been debated.

Compare Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 605-07 (impact is minimal) with Epstein, supra note 1,
at 651 (any product-related accident is now presumptively actionable). As one commentator

has noted: "It is hard to conceive of any product-related accident which would not permit
some claim that the accident was caused by something in the product's design." Schwartz,

supra note 1, at 466 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). This criticism, however, is
based on the Barker formulation, which would only require a plaintiff to prove that the prod-

uct proximately caused the injury before shifting the burden to the defendant. This note, however, proposes that the plaintiff also prove that a feasible design alternative exists before the
burden switches to the defendant.
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cases'1 7 that is consistent with the negligence principles of the riskutility analysis, and with the major goal of products liability-to relieve the plaintiff of the difficult evidentiary burden inherent in a
negligence cause of action.1 68 The UPLA, in its broadest sense, rejects imposition of absolute liability on a manufacturer in favor of
rules of liability founded on fault or blameworthiness.169 From this
basis, the specific rules relating to design defect cases are formulated. The analysis accompanying the UPLA specifically notes the
absence of any of the elements of a consumer expectations test for
reasons of "economics and practicality."170 In addition to the fact
that there are relatively few situations where consumer expectations
are useful, the UPLA states that the consumer expectations test
takes subjectivity to its most extreme end. Each trier of fact is
likely to have a different understanding of abstract consumer expectations. Moreover, most consumers are not familiar with the details of the manufacturing process and cannot abstractly evaluate
conscious design alternatives.171
Without consumer expectations as an independent test, the
UPLA provides that design defect cases are to be analyzed solely in
terms of a formula based on pure negligence/risk-utility balancing of
factors. Such an approach allows the trier of fact to find a product
defective if, and only if, it was "unreasonably unsafe."17 2 Before concluding that a product is either defective or reasonably safe, the trier
of fact is instructed to balance:
(1) the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's
harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms; against
(2) the manufacturer's burden of designing a product that would
have prevented those harms, and the adverse effect that alternative
design would have on the usefulness of the product.173
167. But see, Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability
Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 227-33 (1979) (placing burden on plaintiff for forseeability of risk and technological feasibility in a negligence framework imposes too
large a burden; eliminating utility considerations in a risk-utility analysis creates an unworkable test; abandoning consumer expectations test eliminates a desirable threshhold level of
liability on defendant-manufacturer). The concerns of these authors would not be at issue,
however, if the burden of proof is shifted properly to the defendant, as this note advocates.
168. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
169. Introduction to UPLA, supra note 6, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,715.
170. UPLA, supra note 6, § 104(B) Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,724.
171. Id.
172. Id. § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
173. Id. § 104(B) Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723.
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Two observations are in order. First, the UPLA specifically requires
weighing the adverse effect of the proposed alternative design, a factor implicit in the Wade-Keeton criteria and found in Cepeda1l" and
Suter,17 5 yet not given full attention by the Dawson court.176 Arguably, this factor is part of the UPLA instruction because it is central
to any design defect analysis if absolute liability is to be avoided and
if liability is to be imposed7 on a manufacturer only where there is
17
fault or blameworthiness.
A second objective of the UPLA vis h vis New Jersey law is
met through the UPLA's requirement that the trier of fact evaluate
the risk-utility factors as of the time of manufacture178 and not as of
the time of sale which is the approach embodied in the Wade-Keeton
analysis adopted in New Jersey.179 The UPLA shifts the inquiry
from reasonableness of a product's design at the time of sale to the
time when the manufacturer had control of the product and, unlike
the Wade-Keeton analysis, does not impose upon the manufacturer
the prospect of liability because of intervening technologies between
manufacture and trial. Therefore, the UPLA, consistent with the notion of liability only with fault, looks only to circumstances up to and
including the time of manufacture and does not impose liability for
any subsequent modifications that could have been made to the product. This approach closely approximates the negligence principles
underlying the risk-utility analysis, and therefore is preferable to the
Wade-Keeton approach which looks to the time of sale and therefore
is strict liability in nature.180
Not all strict liability features should be abandoned. Although
the UPLA does not advocate shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, the allocation of evidentiary burdens, advanced by the
Barker court,"81 should be retained, albeit in modified form. It is
unduly burdensome for the plaintiff, as noted by the Barker court, to
present all the factors inherent in a complex risk-utility analysis; 82
174. 76 N.J. 152, 174-75, 386 A.2d 816, 827 (1978).
175. See supra text accompanying note 103.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 147-55.

177.

Failure to expressly address the shortcoming of the alternative design proposed by

the plaintiff approaches an absolute liability analysis, since juries without knowledge of the

proposed product's disadvantages would focus only on the likelihood that the alternative design
would have prevented the plaintiff's injury.
178. UPLA, supra note 6, § 104(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 70-76.
181. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
182. See id.
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many of those factors often involve technical matters peculiarly
within the knowledge of the manufacturer.1 83 Yet, the Barker formulation appears to make almost all products cases actionable.,," To
overcome this, the plaintiff should be required to propose a feasible
alternative design with the burden on the defendant to prove that
this alternative design was not practicable. This test does not shift
the focus of the risk-utility test away from negligence principles because the goal of reducing the incidence of injuries and, compensating the injured is still met. Using only risk-utility factors to analyze
a product as it existed at the time of manufacture injects the concepts of reasonableness and due care into the inquiry and focuses on
the factors that the manufacturer considers when designing a product. Furthermore, by holding the manufacturer to a negligence standard in all design defect cases, the manufacturer's design choice
trade-offs can be viewed in the same light as the risk-utility tradeoffs brought out at trial. Finally, a design defect is neither random
nor unpredictable but is the result of deliberate and documentable
decisions on the part of the manufacturer. Since a plaintiff's case can
implicate an entire product line, the test should be based entirely on
the fault or blameworthiness of the manufacturer and not on strict
liability/warranty principles.
CONCLUSION

Products liability has come a long way since the days of MacPherson8 5 and Henningson.'8 While lowering the privity barrier in
both traditional negligence and warranty cases advanced plaintiffs'
damage recoveries for injuries caused by defective products, the
strict liability notions foreshadowed in Escola 87 and Greenman'"
were most appropriately applied in manufacturing defect cases.
Their use in design defect cases proved much more troublesome.
In a case of defective manufacture, comparing the alleged defective product with the nondefective manufactured product easily
determined the presence or absence of defect; design defect cases,
however, afforded no such easy comparison. In early design defect
183. Id.
184. See supra note 166.
185. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
186. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
187. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
188. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
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cases both negligence and strict liability principles were applied. In
Greenman, for example, Justice Traynor observed not only that consumer expectations should be examined, but also that it might be
appropriate to determine if there was something inherently wrong
with the product. 89 When there were no actual consumer expectations concerning the viability of the product, however, "something
wrong with the product," 190 standing alone, provided for no comparison in a design case.
While section 402A provided the "unreasonably dangerous"
modifier to the term defect, it also seemed to indicate to the Cronin
court that a design would be defective only if it was unreasonably
dangerous; this would introduce a negligence complexion to the analysis and impose a dual burden on plaintiffs. To the Barker court,
however, retention of the consumer expectations language of section
402A was still useful. Although the manufacturer could be shielded
from liability "so long as the product did not fall below the ordinary
consumer's expectations as to the product's safety,"191 a dual test
consisting of risk-utility principles and a consumer expectations test,
where strict liability principles were still applicable as a minimum
test for liability in limited cases, could overcome this problem. 1 " The
Barker court expressly sorted these two dissimilar tests into a workable test for the California courts, although the New Jersey Supreme
Court, which also adopted both negligence and strict liability principles, did not.
In New Jersey, Cepeda continued the growing trend toward
risk-utility principles, but the Suter court combined dissimilar strict
liability and negligence principles and formulated a test that was unworkable from its inception. While the Suter court probably intended to fashion a Barker-like test, in practice it only half-succeeded. Because of the unworkable Suter design defect test,19 3 the
Dawson court felt compelled to reach a decision, albeit hesitantly,
for the plaintiff. As noted earlier, if the Suter test had been correctly
formulated the Dawson court either would have reversed the district
court or remanded the case for further consideration. 94
189.

59 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700; see supra text accompany-

ing notes 39-40.
190.

20 Cal. 3d at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.

191.

20 Cal. 3d at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (footnote omitted).

192.

See id. at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. See supra text accompa-

nying notes 61-63.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 98-115.
194. On remand, the trial court would instruct the jury to weigh the utility of the alter-
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The lesson from New Jersey is clear. Design defect cases present difficult analytical problems for both court and jury, and if a
court is to apply both consumer expectations/strict liability principles and risk-utility/negligence principles, it must clearly differentiate the application of the two dissimilar principles. 9 5 Alternatively,
the use of consumer expectations as an independent test for liability
could be eliminated. In most situations, consumer expectations do
not apply, and in those limited situations where they do, the subjectivity of jury speculation about consumer perception leaves little
hope for consistent treatment. This provides little, if any, guidance to
manufacturers. Indeed, the Dawson court was concerned about decisions varying from state to state,"" but the concern arose only because of the court's use of Suter's consumer expectations language in
the risk-utility test then at hand.19
Using risk-utility principles alone, as in the UPLA, with the
burden on the defendant to prove the inferiority of the alternative,
accomplishes the goals of holding a manufacturer liable only where
there is fault and protecting the injured plaintiff from an often onerous burden of proof. In design defect cases, unlike manufacturing
defect cases, a negligence standard encourages better behavior on
the part of the manufacturer in his conscious product design choices.
The trade-offs involved in a risk-utility analysis are similar to those a
manufacturer must make in designing his product. Therefore, to best
promote the objectives of products liability and the goals of a society
dedicated both to technological advancement and consumer protection, the reasonableness of a manufacturer's design choices should be
evaluated by using a risk-utility analysis. This focuses on the product
as it exists at the time of manufacture, and places on the defendant
the burden to prove that the plaintiff's proposed alternative design is
not superior to the product's existing design.
Lawrence H. Haber

native design proposed by the Dawsons against the risks that the alternate design would entail.
By explicitly weighing all the pertinent risk-utility factors through a comprehensive jury instruction, the jury could very well conclude that the feasibility of the alternative design is
outweighed by the increased risk the design would introduce. See supra text accompanying
notes 147-56.
195. The Barker court, for example, clearly delineates when each of the parts of the
two-prong test apply. See supra text accompanying notes 61-71.
196. 630 F.2d at 962-63.
197. See Id. at 959.
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